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Abstract
The difference between actual borrowings and borrowing limits alone generates information
asymmetry in the credit card market. This information asymmetry can make the market
incomplete and create ex post misallocations. Households that are denied credit could well turn
out to be ex post less risky than some credit card holders who borrow large portions of their
borrowing limits. Using data from the U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances, the authors ﬁnd a
positive relationship between borrower quality and borrowing limits, controlling for banks’
selection of credit card holders and the endogeneity of interest rates. Their estimation reveals how
interest rates have a negative inﬂuence on the optimal borrowing limits offered by banks.
JEL classiﬁcation: D4, D82, C3
Bank classiﬁcation: Market structure and pricing; Econometric and statistical methods
Résumé
La différence entre le montant des limites de crédit accordées et le montant effectif des emprunts
sufﬁt à créer sur le marché des cartes de crédit une asymétrie d’information. Cette asymétrie peut
rendre ce marché incomplet et produire, a posteriori, une mauvaise allocation des ressources. Il se
pourrait fort bien, en effet, que les ménages qui se voient refuser un prêt représentent un risque
moins élevé que certains détenteurs de cartes qui font largement appel à leur ligne de crédit. À
partir des données de l’enquête menée par la Réserve fédérale américaine sur les ﬁnances des
consommateurs, les auteurs concluent à une corrélation positive entre la solvabilité de
l’emprunteur et la limite de crédit, une fois pris en compte l’endogénéité des taux débiteurs et les
effets de la sélection par les banques des détenteurs de cartes. D’après leurs estimations, le niveau
optimal des limites de crédit consenties varie en fonction inverse des taux d’intérêt.
Classiﬁcation JEL : D4, D82, C3
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Structure de marché et ﬁxation des prix; Méthodes économétriques
et statistiques  1 
1.  Introduction 
  It is well accepted that borrowing limits on collateralized loans are primarily 
determined by the amounts of collateral pledged by the borrowers.  However, for non-
collateralized loans, such as those on credit cards, the information about borrowers’ 
repayment abilities plays a crucial role in determining their credit card borrowing limits 
or credit limits.  Asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders and the lack of 
collateral to mitigate that informational  asymmetry are mainly responsible for the 
existence of  credit rationing  in some credit markets.    Imperfect information about 
borrower risk induces banks to refuse credit to some borrowers even if the latter would 
accept higher interest rates for their loans.  Credit bureau reports provide some critical 
information about  borrower  riskiness,  which  banks use to alleviate some of the 
informational asymmetry and to improve the quality of their loan-supply decision.  
Publicly available information about borrowers’ creditworthiness helps banks sort their 
client pool into broad risk classes.  Banks do not, however, have perfect knowledge about 
individual borrower risk.    In the case of  lines of credit, such as  credit cards, banks 
particularly do not know how much a borrower will actually borrow on the line, which is 
a key determinant of the borrower’s repayment probability.  Therefore, credit rationing 
persists in the unsecured credit card market.  Borrowers with no or “bad” credit reports 
are more likely to be refused access to credit cards by banks.  Those credit card holders 
who have “better” creditworthiness are perceived to have higher repayment abilities and 
therefore are likely to be provided with higher credit card borrowing limits.    Profit-
maximizing banks choose to provide exactly the amount of credit to their borrowers that 
maximizes their expected profits.    Therefore, a careful analysis of the elements of 
borrowers’ creditworthiness and the  optimal line of credit contracts will help us 
understand the determinants of credit card borrowing limits.  We find that the difference 
between actual borrowings and offered credit limits is enough to generate information 
asymmetry in the credit card market.  Moreover, individuals who are rationed out of the 
credit card market could very well turn out to have been “ convenience users,”
1 and 
therefore  ex post  were  less risky than some  credit card  holders  who borrow large 
fractions of their credit limits.  Thus, not only can information asymmetry in the credit 
                                                    
1 “Convenience users” are individuals who use credit cards for transactions purposes only.   2 
card market make the market incomplete (through credit rationing), but it can also result 
in ex post misallocations. 
A typical credit card contract is two-dimensional.  Banks offer a rate of interest 
along with a pre-set borrowing limit to their potential borrowers.  The two-dimensional 
nature o f loan contracts  makes  credit card interest rates endogenous.    Empirical 
identification of the determinants of credit card borrowing limits requires us to correct for 
this endogeneity.  Moreover, not all individuals have credit cards.  The set of credit card 
holders is a selected sample and therefore our estimation needs to account for the sample 
selection bias.  Controlling for the banks’ selection of  credit card holders and the 
endogeneity of credit card interest rates, we find a positive relationship between borrower 
quality and b orrowing limits on credit cards.  Our estimation also reveals how the 
endogenous interest rates negatively influence the optimal credit card borrowing limits.  
In section 2, we describe the background and previous research on these issues.  In 
section 3 , we introduce the  theoretical model.  The data  are described and  the 
econometric model  built in s ections 4 and 5, respectively.  Section 6 describes  the 
empirical results and section 7 offers some conclusions. 
 
 
2.  Background 
Beginning with Ausubel (1991), researchers have examined consumer lines of 
credit, especially with regards to credit cards.  The bulk of the literature on credit cards 
concentrates on explaining why the average credit card interest rates remain sticky at a 
high level.  Ausubel (1991) argues that the reason for the downward rigidity of credit 
card interest rates and supernormal profits is the failure of competition in the credit card 
market.    He partly attributes this failure to  myopic consumers who  do not foresee 
indebtedness and interest payments on their  outstanding balances.  Brito and Hartley 
(1995), however, argue that consumers carry high-interest credit card debt not because of 
myopia, but because low-interest bank loans involve transactions costs.  Mester’s (1994) 
view is that low-risk borrowers who have access to low-interest collateralized loans leave 
the credit card market.   This makes the average client pool of the credit card market 
riskier,  thereby preventing interest rates from going down.   Park (1997) points to the 
option-value nature of credit cards to explain their price stickiness.  He argues that the   3 
interest rate that produces zero profit for credit card issuers is higher than the interest 
rates on most other loans, because rational credit card holders borrow more money when 
they become riskier.  An empirical paper by Calem and Mester (1995) finds evidence that 
consumers are reluctant to search for lower rates because of  high search costs in this 
market.  Cargill and Wendel (1996) suggest that, due to the high presence of convenience 
users, even modest search costs could keep the majority of consumers from seeking out 
lower interest rates.  Kerr (2002) focuses on interest rate dispersion within the credit card 
market.  He studies a two-fold information asymmetry: one between the banks (i.e., the 
lenders) and the borrowers, and the other within the banks themselves.  Some banks (the 
external banks) have access to only the publicly available credit histories, while others 
(the home banks) have additional access to borrowers’ private financial accounts.  Kerr 
argues that, in equilibrium, the average rate of interest charged by the so-called external 
banks would be h igher than that charged by the home b anks, because the average 
borrower associated with the external banks would be riskier. 
Most of the existing literature on the credit card market focuses on analyzing the 
various aspects of  its pricing.    Despite the fact that  credit card loan contracts are 
essentially two-dimensional, researchers have largely ignored the credit-limit dimension 
of the contract.  Gross and Souleles (2002) utilize a unique new data set on credit card 
accounts to analyze how people respond to changes in credit supply.  They find that 
increases in credit limits generate an immediate and significant rise in debt, consistent 
with the buffer-stock models of precautionary saving, as cited in Deaton (1991), Carroll 
(1992), and Ludvigson  (1999).  Dunn and Kim (2002) argue that banks, in order to 
strategize against Ponzi-schemers in the credit card market, tend to provide lower credit 
limits to high-risk borrowers, despite giving them a larger number of cards.  Though they 
find some empirical support for their hypothesis on credit limits, Dunn and Kim choose 
to focus their formal empirical analysis on an estimation of credit card default  rates.  
Castronova and Hagstrom (2004), using simple two-stage least squares estimation, find 
that the action in the credit market is mostly in the limits and not in the balances. 
In this paper, we build a general theoretical model that captures the key elements 
of credit card loan contracts, and we test the relationship between borrower quality and   4 
credit card borrowing limits, correcting for the banks’ selection of credit card holders and 
the influence of endogenous interest rates. 
 
 
3.  The Theoretical Model 
Consider a model where banks are competitively offering non-collateralized lines 
of credit, such as credit cards.  A line of credit is a borrowing instrument whereby the 
borrower is offered a borrowing limit (or credit limit) and an interest rate.  The borrower 
can borrow up to the credit limit.  Interest charges accrue only if some positive amount is 
borrowed on the line.  A line of credit contract incorporates the traditional fixed-loan 
contract as a special case when the entire credit limit is borrowed at the very outset.  
Banks are assumed to procure funds at a rate rF.  Based on publicly available credit 
reports, banks are able to partition their clients into broad risk classes.  Let us assume that 
these classes, represented by i, are such that  ˛ i [ i i, ].  The variable i can be considered 
the credit score that credit bureaus construct for all potential borrowers.  Let us also 
assume for simplicity that there is only one borrower in every risk class, i.
2  A typical 
credit card contract offered to class i consists of a vector (Li, ri), where Li is the credit 
limit and ri is the interest rate.  Using the framework put forward by Dey (2004), we 
argue that borrowers primarily use lines of credit to smooth consumption across various 
states and time periods.  This framework essentially makes the desired borrowings on 
lines o f credit become random variables  -  functions of  the interest  rates  and the 
underlying wealth shocks.  Let qi represent the underlying wealth shock, such that we 
have the optimal borrowing as  ) ( ~ ); ; ( i i i i i G r B B q q q = , where  ). , ( ¥ -¥ ˛ i q   We can 
write  ) ( ~ i i B F B ,  ) ( ) ( i i B f B F = ¢ , where  ). , ( ¥ -¥ ˛ i B   Moreover, qi’s are assumed to 
be independent of each other (and so are Bi’s).  Using the optimal borrowing function, we 
can derive an inverse demand curve for borrower i as ri = r(Bi; qi).  The repayment 
probability for a borrower increases with the risk-class measure, i, and decreases with the 
                                                    
2 We therefore assume that banks offer the same contract to all individuals within a particular risk class 
(with the same credit score), despite the potential heterogeneity in their repayment abilities.   5 
amount owed, Di, where Di = RiBi and Ri = (1 + ri) = R(Bi; qi).
3  We represent the class i 
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The only uncertainty that banks have about borrowers’ repayment probabilities results 
from their inability to know the actual borrowings to be undertaken on the lines they 
extend.  In the following section, we consider a typical bank’s profit-maximization 
problem where it is offering an unsecured line of credit, such as a credit card. 
 
 
3.1  A bank’s profit-maximization problem 
The expected profit from offering an unsecured line of credit contract (Li, ri) to 
class i is represented by  .
i p   For class i, a bank’s profit-maximization problem is given 
by: 
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3 Banks know that actual borrowings undertaken on credit cards change borrowers’ repayment 
probabilities.  Since banks have no way of knowing how much a borrower in a particular risk class will 
borrow, line of credit contracts cannot be conditioned on actual borrowings. 
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Proposition: 
(i)  Banks choose 
*
i L  and  ), ; (
* *
i i i L r r q =  such that  ). , ( 0 ) , (
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(ii)  For all banks, maximizing the total expected profit over all risk classes is 
equivalent to integrating over all  risk  classes the maximized  expected 
profit of every risk class.
4 
The optimal credit card contract offered to borrower  i, given by the pair  ) , (
* *
i i r L , is 
chosen such that, if 
*
i L  is actually borrowed at price  ), ; (
* *
i i i L r r q =  our bank’s profit 
maximization and zero-profit conditions are simultaneously satisfied for the risk class 
that borrower i represents.  We show that the difference between actual borrowings and 
offered credit limits is enough to generate information asymmetry in the credit card 
market.  Moreover, individuals who are rationed out of the credit card market could very 
well turn out to have been ex post less risky than some credit card holders who borrow 
large fractions of their credit limits.  Thus, not only can information asymmetry in the 
credit card market make the market incomplete (through credit rationing), but it can also 
result in ex post misallocations. 
Our bank’s optimal credit card contract for risk class i can be represented by the 
following triangular structure: 
(i) The equilibrium credit limit equation,   
 
*
i L  =  ), , , , (
* i r r L i F i q               (2) 
(ii) The equilibrium price equation, 
                                                    
4  This follows from the fact that wealth shocks,  qi’s, (and therefore actual borrowings,  Bi’s,) are 
independent of each other and banks are forced to make zero expected profits in every risk class.   7 
 
*
i r  =  ). , , (
* i r R i F q               (3) 
Therefore, our theory of lines of credit contracts yields to a bivariate equation system that 
can be used for empirical analysis.  Using household-level data, we can potentially test 
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.  Though we have unambiguous signs for the reduced-form partial derivatives, 
the signs for the partial derivatives of the structural-form optimal borrowing limit 























6  We hope to use our econometric 
model and the empirically verified results to shed some light on these ambiguous signs. 
 
4.  Data 
The data used in this study are from the 1998 U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances 
(SCF).  SCF is a nationwide survey conducted by the National Opinion Research Center 
and the U.S. Federal Reserve Board.  The 1998 SCF provides a large and rich data set on 
household assets, liabilities, demographic characteristics, and a number of variables that 
capture household attitudes.  In 1998, 4,305 households were surveyed and 3,233 of them 
had at least one bank-type credit card, which amounts to 75.1 per cent of the total number 
of households in the sample. 
Table 1 defines the variables used in our econometric analyses.  Table 2 compares 
the mean characteristics of consumers with credit cards against those without. 
 
                                                    
5 See the appendix for a discussion of the partial derivatives. 
6 The ambiguity regarding the structural parameters arises from the fact that it is impossible to theoretically 
identify a supply function when the price is endogenous.  Identification of the structural parameters 
requires further restrictions, which will be addressed in more detail in section 5.   8 
Table 1: Definition of Variables 
Variables  Type  Explanation 
RHI  Continuous  HELOC
* interest rate (Maximum interest rate charged 
among the different HELOCs taken out by the household) 
DELINQUENCY  Binary 
1 – Got behind in payments by two months or more 
0 – Otherwise 
BANKRUPTCY  Binary 
1 – Declared bankruptcy 
0 – Otherwise 
RCI  Continuous  Credit card interest rate 
LOGCLIMIT  Continuous  Logarithm of credit card borrowing limit 
LOGINCOME  Continuous  Logarithm of income 
ALPHAI  Continuous  Fraction of HELOC and/or mortgage debt repaid 
HOUSEHOLDSIZE  Continuous  Household size 
AGE  Continuous  Age of the household 
EMPLOYMENT1  Binary  1 – Not working 
0 – Otherwise 
EMPLOYMENT2  Binary  1 – Retired 
0 – Otherwise 
EMPLOYMENT3  Binary  1 – Working and not self-employed 
0 – Otherwise 
EMPLOYMENT4  Binary  1 – Working and self-employed 
0 – Otherwise 
LIQCONSTRAINT 
Binary  1 – Did not obtain as much credit as applied for despite 
      reapplying or did not reapply after the first refusal 
0 – Otherwise 
HELOC  Binary  1 – Has taken out a HELOC 
0 – Otherwise 
SHOPINVEST  Categorical 
0 – Almost no shopping for the very best terms 
1 – Moderate shopping 
2 – Great deal of shopping 







   9 






  Mean  Mean 
HOUSEHOLDSIZE  2.7  2.6 
DELINQUENCY  0.03  0.1 
BANKRUPTCY  0.06  0.1 
LOGINCOME  11.4  9.4 
EMPLOYMENT1  0.06  0.3 
EMPLOYMENT2  0.2  0.2 
EMPLOYMENT4  0.3  0.1 
SHOPINVEST  1.2  0.9 
ALPHAI  0.01  0.01 
AGE  50.8  47.0 
LIQCONSTRAINT  0.1  0.1 
HELOC  0.1  0.02 
RHI  0.6  0.1 
RCI  14.5  - 
LOGCLIMIT  9.5  - 
  Note: All monetary variables are in thousand dollars. 
 
5.  The Econometric Model 
Household i now represents the risk class (or borrower) i.  Let 
*
i L  denote the 
profit-maximizing borrowing limit  that all banks collectively extend to household  i.  
According to our theoretical model describing the equilibrium in the credit card market, 
we have 
*
i L =  ). , , , (
* i r r L i F i q  
  The variable rF has no variation across households.  Therefore, the effect of rF on 
*
i L  cannot be empirically tested.  Moreover, let the vector X1i denote the information on 
household i that banks use to define the household’s risk measure, i.  The vector X1i 
consists of variables included in publicly available credit reports and the variables that 
banks gather while processing credit card applications.  Table 3 provides a complete list 
of variables included in an individual credit report.  Hence, the vector X1i consists of   10
          Table 3: Credit Report Details 
Personal information 
•  Name 
•  Current and previous address 
•  Social security number 
•  Telephone number 
•  Date of birth 
•  Current and previous employers 
Credit History 
Type of accounts: 
1.  Retail credit cards 
2.  Bank loans 
3.  Finance company loans 
4.  Mortgages 
5.  Bank credit cards 
 
Information available: 
1.  Account number 
2.  Creditor’s name 
3.  Amount borrowed 
4.  Amount owed 
5.  Credit limit 
6.  Dates when accounts were opened, updated, or closed 
7.  Timeliness of payments 
8.  Late payments 
Public records 
§  Tax liens 
§  Bankruptcies 
§  Court judgments 
Inquiries  List of all parties who have requested a copy of your credit report 
Source: TransUnion 
 
personal information, such as employment status, age, and the size of the household i.  It 
also contains information on credit history variables, such as access to alternative lines of 
credit (e.g., HELOCs), the fraction of mortgage and/or HELOC debt repaid, timeliness of 
payments, bankruptcy records,  and credit inquiries.    The vector  X1i  also includes 
information on household income, which is gathered during the application process for a 
credit card.  We postulate a linear structural-form equation for
*
i L as 
 
*
i L  = g
*
i r + b1
¢X1i + v1i.             (4)   11
In equation (4), the banks’ opportunity cost of funds, rF, contributes to the constant term, 
and the underlying wealth shock that influences a household’s desired borrowing level 
(qi) goes into the error term, v1i. 
Since the optimal credit card interest rate is given by 
*
i r  =  ) , , (
* i r R i F q , the linear 
reduced-form equation for 
*
i r is given by 
*
i r  = b2
¢X2i + v2i.              (5) 
Also in equation (5), the variable rF contributes to the constant term and the underlying 
wealth shock (qi) goes into the error term, v2i. 
The vector  X2i consists of  all the variables present in  vector  X1i and some 
identifying variables (which are influential yet absent in public credit reports) that capture 
aspects of a  household’s search behaviour, such as  a household’s propensity to shop 
around for the best rates before making major savings and investment decisions, and the 
interest rates on alternative lines of credit, such as HELOCs. 
The combination  ) , (
* *
i i r L  is observed if the banks decide to offer a credit card to 
household i; i.e., if 
*
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￿
￿
￿  otherwise. 
In the equations above,  i L  and  i r  represent the observed credit card borrowing limit and 
interest rate, respectively;  X1i and X2i are vectors of exogenous variables;  v1i and v2i 
follow bivariate n ormal with means zero, variances  s1
2 and  s2
2, respectively, and 
covariance s 12.  If X2i contains at least one variable that is not included in X1i, then all the 
parameters of the model are identified.  To identify the effect of the endogenous interest 
rate on the credit card borrowing limit that is offered to household i, we use the estimated 
credit card interest rate,  i r ˆ , as an instrument.
7 
Maximum-likelihood e stimation is used to estimate the proposed econometric 
model.  To form the likelihood function, we have to relate the dependent variables to 
                                                    
7 See Lee, Maddala, and Trost (1980), and Wales and Woodland (1980) for technical details.   12
their empirical counterparts, and describe the process by which the observable 
counterparts are generated in terms of the underlying stochastic components.  Household 
i is observed to have a credit card if 
*
i L  > 0. 
Substituting the  equation for t he credit card interest rate into the borrowing limit 
equation, the decision on whether to offer a credit card can be written as 
  b1
¢ X1i + gb2
¢ X2i > - (v1i + gv2i), 
or,  Ii > vi  
where vi ~  N (0, s1
2 + g
2s2
2 + 2gs12) ”  N (0, sv
2), and 
Ii = b1
¢ X1i + gb2
¢ X2i. 
The likelihood of observing household i without a credit card is 
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where F is the standard normal cumulative density function. 
Hence, the likelihood of observing the data consisting (say) of N households with M 
households without credit cards is 
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where b(.) is the bivariate normal density function, n(.) is the normal density function, 
and 
  v1i = Li - b1
¢X1i - gri 
  v2i = ri - b2
¢X2i. 
Now,  v2i ~ N (0, s2
2) 
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The corresponding log-likelihood function can be written as 
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) (
)] ( log[ log
































where  (.) f  is the standard normal density function. 
A multi-step procedure is used to estimate the parameters of the model.  First, the 
parameters of the econometric model are estimated using the two-stage probit method 
described by Lee, Maddala, and Trost (1980).  This two-step procedure yields consistent 
estimates of all the parameters of the model.    To  obtain  asymptotically efficient 
parameter estimates, the consistent estimates a re used as  initial  values for the final 

















= .  Let us further define a dummy variable, 
Di, such that, 
Di = 1 if household i has a credit card (i.e., 
*
i L  > 0) 
    = 0 otherwise. 
For credit card holders, 
  , ) ( 3 1 1 i i v i i i v r X L + + + ¢ = d l s g b  










Consistent estimates of  i d  can be obtained by running a probit of the decision to offer a 
credit card.  Then, we can estimate the following equation using ordinary least squares 
(OLS) and obtain  i r ˆ : 
  . ) ˆ ( 4 2 2 i i i i v X r + + ¢ = d ml b  
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We then estimate the following equation using OLS: 
  . ) ˆ ( ˆ 3 1 1 i i v i i i v r X L + + + ¢ = d l s g b  
This two-step procedure (after correcting for the standard errors)  gives us consistent 
estimates of all the parameters of the model, which are used as starting values for the 
maximum-likelihood procedure. 
 
6.  Results and Discussion 
  Table 4 reports the results of a probit estimation that explains a bank’s decision to 
offer a credit card to a potential borrower.
8  The household’s income, age, and self-
employed status significantly improve their likelihood of getting a credit card.  The fact 
that self-employed households are more likely to receive credit cards seems counter- 
 
Table 4: A Bank’s Decision to Offer a Credit Card 

























































*** Significant at 1 per cent; 
** significant at 5 per cent; 
* significant at 10 per cent. 
 
intuitive.  Self-employed households face higher variations of income and are likely to 
have higher default risks; therefore, banks should extend lower amounts of credit to them.  
The size of the household, unemployment, delinquency, and a declaration of bankruptcy 
                                                    
8 Table 1 defines the variables used in all the tables of this section.   15
diminish the chance of obtaining a credit card.  If the household is liquidity constrained, 
then there is a higher probability that they will be denied a credit card.  The more the 
household looks around for the best rates, or if they have taken out a HELOC, the more 
likely they are to have a credit card.  In general, the results indicate that the higher the 
household’s creditworthiness, the greater their likelihood of obtaining a credit card. 
 






















***                1.347
-0.038                    0.057              
1.567
***                  0.481
0.591
*                    0.357 
0.141                      0.094             
-0.042                    0.412 
0.211                      0.288
-0.08                      0.208              
1.361
***                  0.398
0.2                            0.32
0.007                      0.007             
-0.346
**                  0.135
0.445                      0.387
-0.09
*                       0.05              
0.749                      0.655
 
R
2 = 0.02 
      F-value = 5.11
*** 
      s2 = 4.5 
      N = 3233 
      
*** Significant at 1 per cent; 
** significant at 5 per cent; 
* significant at 10 per cent. 
a LAMBDA = 
i
i




Table 5 reports the results for the two-stage probit regression for interest rates 
among credit card holders.  Delinquency or a declaration of bankruptcy induces banks to 
charge higher credit card interest rates.  If the household is liquidity constrained, then it is 
also likely to result in a higher credit card interest rate offered by banks.  If the household   16
shops around, then they can obtain a lower interest rate on their credit cards.  The rate on 
an alternative line of credit, such as  a  HELOC, also reduces the offered credit card 
interest rate.  Finally, the estimated value of µ  is 0.749.  Since this estimated value is not 
significantly different from zero, we conclude that there is no empirical evidence of 
sample selection in our estimates of the equation for the credit card interest rate.  We 
conclude that the better the creditworthiness of the household, the lower the credit card 







ri .  Moreover, controlling for the credit risk of the household, the more 
pronounced is their search behaviour, the lower is their credit card interest rate. 
Table 6 reports the two-stage probit estimates of the equation for the credit card 
borrowing limit for the credit card holders.  The higher the income of the household, the 
higher the credit limit offered by banks.  If the household is self-employed or has already 
taken out a HELOC, then again they receive a higher credit card borrowing limit from 
banks.  The endogenous variable, the credit card interest rate, has a negative effect on 
banks’ line of credit supply.  Charging a higher credit card interest rate will raise the 
default probability of a borrower of any given risk type.  A typical bank’s optimal credit 
limit  should, therefore, fall to compensate for this rise in default risk.    Finally,  the 
estimated value of sv is 0.796.  Since the estimated value is also significant, we conclude 
that there is empirical evidence of sample selection in the estimates of the equation for 
the credit card borrowing limit.  Moreover, the estimated effect of sample selection is 
positive.  Therefore, the higher the creditworthiness of the borrower, the higher is their 
likelihood of being offered a credit card and the higher is the borrowing limit extended by 
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***                  2.15 
-0.004                     0.038              
-0.167                         0.4 
-0.319                       0.23 
0.359
***                    0.07              
-0.326                     0.244 
0.063                      0.177 
0.353
***                  0.122 
0.108                      0.195              
0.014
***                  0.005 
0.101                      0.334 
0.432
**                   0.168 
-0.428
**                  0.194 
0.796
*                     0.466 
 
-LogL = -7717.693 
     s1 = 2.679 
     s 12 = 9.263 
     N = 3233 
       
*** Significant at 1 per cent; 
** significant at 5 per cent; 
* significant at 10 per cent. 
a LAMBDA = 
i
i




Table 7 reports the full-information maximum l ikelihood (FIML) estimates of the 
equation for the credit card interest rate.  Delinquency or a declaration of bankruptcy 
induces banks to charge higher credit card interest rates.  If the household is unemployed 
or liquidity constrained, then it is again likely to result in banks offering a higher credit 
card interest rate.  The income of the household or their self-employed status depresses 
the offered interest rate in credit card contracts.  If the household shops around for the 
best rates, then they can obtain a lower interest rate on credit cards.  Hence, an active 
search for a lower rate results in a lower rate for a household of any risk type.  Moreover, 
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***                1.142
0.036                      0.067                 
2.072
***                  0.482              
0.975
***                  0.341
-0.411
***                0.082             
1.756
***                  0.426
0.342                      0.338              
-0.425
*                   0.231 
2.079
***                  0.404
0.09                        1.344
0.003                      0.008
-0.944
***                0.142 
-0.441                      0.46 
-0.075                    0.059 
       
*** Significant at 1 per cent; 
** significant at 5 per cent; 
* significant at 10 per cent. 
 
  Table 8 reports the FIML estimates of the equation for the credit card borrowing 
limit.  The higher the income or the age of the household, the higher the credit limit 
offered by banks.  If the household is self-employed or already has taken out a HELOC, 
then again they receive a higher credit card borrowing limit from banks.  Unemployed 
households, however, obtain  lower  credit card borrowing limits from banks.   The 
endogenous variable, the credit card interest rate, again has a negative effect on the 
bank’s loan supply.  Hence our maximum-likelihood estimates are consistent with the 
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***                2.958
-0.068                 0.071              
0.797                      0.608
0.009                      0.381
0.658
***                  0.091             
-1.108
**                  0.482
0.161                        0.36
0.441
*                    0.246 
0.284                        2.79
0.02
**                     0.009 
0.776                      0.535              
0.688
*                    0.375 
-1.126
***                0.164 
 
5.317
***                  0.617
5.018
***                  0.158
0.675
***                  0.081
 
-Log-L = -13941.71 
       
*** Significant at 1 per cent; 
** significant at 5 per cent; 
* significant at 10 per cent. 
 
7.  Conclusions 
  Line of credit contracts (such as credit card contracts) are fundamentally different 
from traditional fixed-loan contracts.  An understanding of the key elements of credit 
card contracts requires a theoretical separation of the choice of the amount of borrowing 
and the choice of the amount of credit limit, the two-dimensional nature of the contract 
and the market structure under which the borrowers and lenders operate.  We have shown 
that the difference between actual borrowings and offered credit limits is enough to 
generate information asymmetry in the credit card market.  Moreover, individuals who 
are rationed out of the credit card market could very well turn out to have been ex post 
less risky than some credit card holders who borrow large fractions of their credit limits.  
Therefore, not only can information asymmetry in the credit card market make the market 
incomplete (through credit rationing), but it can also result in ex post misallocations.   20
We have theoretically identified the crucial features of  credit card contracts 
offered by banks, and examined the association between borrower quality and the offered 
menu of credit card borrowing limit and interest rate.  We have also been able to capture 
the effect of endogenous interest rates on the offered borrowing limits of households. 
Our results support  the fact that banks use publicly available information on 
potential borrowers to assess their credit risk and to formulate the type of credit card 
contracts to offer.    The  credit card market shows clear evidence of credit rationing.  
Banks refuse lowest-quality borrowers access to credit cards.  Among the credit card 
holders, those with “better” credit  reports are perceived to have higher repayment 
probabilities and therefore are provided with higher  credit card borrowing limits and 
lower interest rates.   Controlling for the borrower’s risk type, we find that  a greater 
search for the best rates on loans significantly reduces the interest rate that they are 
charged on  credit cards.    We also have  found  empirical support for a negative 
relationship between the credit card borrowing limit (loan supply) and the credit card 
interest rate (the price of the loan).  A higher interest rate will raise a borrower’s default 
probability, regardless of their risk type; therefore, the optimal borrowing limit should 
fall to compensate for this rise in default risk. 
Several empirical studies have shown that a household’s actual amount of 
borrowing on credit cards (or their credit card utilization rate) does affect the credit card 
borrowing limit  that banks offer them.   For instance, the credit card borrowing limit 
offered to a “convenience user” of a given risk class is typically higher than that offered 
to a household in the same risk class and yet already borrowing up to the credit limit.  As 
an extension to this paper, one could postulate a dynamic theoretical model where banks 
update their ex ante repayment probabilities and their credit card contracts after observing 
the actual amount borrowed on credit cards.  The extended econometric model should 
have, among other things, the  credit card interest rate and the observed  credit card 
borrowing as endogenous variables.
9 
 
                                                    
9 Such a model may be able to explain why we found self-employed households receiving higher credit 
card borrowing limits and lower  credit card interest rates.  Self-employed households are primarily 
“convenience users” because they use credit cards not for borrowing purposes, but to minimize the liquidity 
risks of their day-to-day business operations.   21
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APPENDIX 
The optimal line of credit contract offered to risk class  i can be represented by the 
following triangular structure: 
*
i L  =  ), , , , (
* i r r L i F i q               (A1) 
 
*
i r  =  ). , , (
* i r R i F q               (A2) 
Substituting equation ( A2) into equation ( A1), we obtain the following reduced-form 
representation of the optimal credit card borrowing limit: 
 
* R
i L  =  ). , , ( i r L i F
R q               (A3) 
Using equations (A2) and (A3), we can write the following: 
  , 0 ) , , ; , (
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            (A9) 


























i i i i
i F































i i i i
F








            (A11) 
Moreover, we know that 
* R
i L = ). , , ), , , ( ( i r i r R L i F i F q q  



























































            (A13) 
Therefore, the theoretically predicted signs of the partial derivatives derived above, and 




















 will depend on the signs of the determinants C, E, F, G 
and D. 















 and  ]. 1 , 0 [ ˛ i r   Therefore, we have  0 >
i
i p .  The bank’s profit 
function also makes  0 <
i
rF p  and  0 <
i
r L F i p .  Let us assume that  , 0 >
i
ri p   , 0 >
i
i Li p  and 
0 <
i
r L i i p .   25
  Given our assumptions and the second-order condition ( 0 <
i


































.  From equations (A12) and ( A13), we 






















 are ambiguous. 
 Bank of Canada Working Papers
Documents de travail de la Banque du Canada
Working papers are generally published in the language of the author, with an abstract in both ofﬁcial
languages. Les documents de travail sont publiés généralement dans la langue utilisée par les auteurs; ils sont
cependant précédés d’un résumé bilingue.
Copies and a complete list of working papers are available from:
Pour obtenir des exemplaires et une liste complète des documents de travail, prière de s’adresser à :
Publications Distribution, Bank of Canada Diffusion des publications, Banque du Canada
234 Wellington Street, Ottawa, Ontario  K1A 0G9 234, rue Wellington, Ottawa (Ontario) K1A 0G9
E-mail: publications@bankofcanada.ca  Adresse électronique : publications@banqueducanada.ca
Web site: http://www.bankofcanada.ca Site Web : http://www.banqueducanada.ca
2005
2005-6 Monetary Policy under Model and Data-Parameter Uncertainty G. Cateau
2005-5 Y a-t-il eu surinvestissement au Canada durant la seconde moitié
des années 1990? Sylvain Martel
2005-4 State-Dependent or Time-Dependent Pricing:
Does It Matter for Recent U.S. Inﬂation? P.J. Klenow and O. Kryvtsov
2005-3 Pre-Bid Run-Ups Ahead of Canadian Takeovers:
How Big Is the Problem? M.R. King and M. Padalko
2005-2 The Stochastic Discount Factor: Extending the Volatility
Bound and a New Approach to Portfolio Selection with
Higher-Order Moments F. Chabi-Yo, R. Garcia, and E. Renault
2005-1 Self-Enforcing Labour Contracts and the Dynamics Puzzle C. Calmès
2004
2004-49 Trade Credit and Credit Rationing in
Canadian Firms R. Cunningham
2004-48 An Empirical Analysis of the Canadian Term
Structure of Zero-Coupon Interest Rates D.J. Bolder, G. Johnson, and A. Metzler
2004-47 The Monetary Origins of Asymmetric Information
in International Equity Markets G.H. Bauer and C. Vega
2004-46 Une approche éclectique d’estimation du PIB
potentiel pour le Royaume-Uni C. St-Arnaud
2004-45 Modelling the Evolution of Credit Spreads
in the United States S.M. Turnbull and J. Yang
2004-44 The Transmission of World Shocks to
Emerging-Market Countries: An Empirical Analysis B. Desroches
2004-43 Real Return Bonds, Inﬂation Expectations,
and the Break-Even Inﬂation Rate I. Christensen, F. Dion, and C. Reid
2004-42 International Equity Flows and Returns: A
Quantitative Equilibrium Approach R. Albuquerque, G. Bauer, and M. Schneider